Majorities in Israel say they want a ceasefire agreement to bring back the remaining hostages in Gaza alive. Majorities also say they are unhappy with the government and that their prime minister is pushing the war forward for personal reasons. So, when negotiations appear to be stalling and the threat of another war with Hezbollah in Lebanon seems closer than ever, you can assume that Israel will be the next step. benjamin netanyahu There will be trouble politically. Far from it.
Netanyahu's popularity ratings have risen again this month, surpassing opposition leader Benny Gantz as the best person to lead Israel for the first time since the conflict began, according to a survey conducted by Israel's Lazarus Agency for the daily newspaper Maariv. And when the Israel Democracy Institute asked whether people want their country to expand the war to fight Hezbollah in Lebanon, the answer was mostly yes.
As I have written before, Israel opening a second front of its own volition would precipitate an unforeseen conflict that could involve Iran, the US and perhaps other countries, none of which would benefit. Yet a large group in Israel believes this is the perfect time for a confrontation with Iran and the proxies it has built around the country. That is unlikely to change after a massive exchange of rocket fire with Hezbollah on Sunday morning, followed by statements from both sides that indicate they do not intend to escalate any further.
The argument is that while Hamas itself is not an existential threat, the enormous power it wields in Tehran is an existential threat – and there has never been a better time to eliminate this threat.
That’s because Hamas has been largely crushed as a military force, leaving Iran with one arrow in its quiver; Israeli settlements along the northern border with Lebanon have already been evacuated, a necessity for any invasion; US forces are already deployed throughout the region to help neutralize any response from Iran in Gaza or the killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in July; and the regime in Tehran has yet to develop a nuclear deterrent.
I asked Avi Melamed, a former Israeli security official whom I have found to be a reliable interpreter, to help me make sense of all this. He said, “Israel is now fighting for its survival, and the biggest threat is coming from the Iranian regime, and I'm not sure people in the West understand that.”
Much of the world may be focused on the existential threat ordinary Palestinians already face in Gaza, but viewed from Tel Aviv, Iran has spent decades building what Melamed calls a “noose around Israel’s neck,” starting with Hezbollah and expanding to include militias in Syria, Iraq, Hamas and the Houthis in Yemen.
Now it is trying to involve Jordan as well, Melamed says. And once Iran has a nuclear deterrent, Tehran's proxies under its umbrella will be able to act against Israel with even more impunity. There will be a conflict with Iran, he says: “It will happen sooner or later, it's inevitable, and right now certain elements are playing into our hands.” Indeed, for some Israelis, Iran and Hezbollah's reluctance to start a war right now means that Israel should start one, because it means the other side is clearly not ready.
I largely agree with this analysis. Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis all speak openly about their goal, which is to eliminate the State of Israel. The October 7 killings and rapes gave a preview of what this could mean for Israelis in the future.
But before concluding that this is what “Israel” wants, it is worth taking a closer look at the survey data. It shows that this is a deeply divided nation, with the 20% Arab population often responding very differently from liberal Jews, and liberal Jews again thinking very differently from religious and nationalist right-wing respondents.
So while most Israelis say they are unhappy with the government, for some it will be because of Netanyahu's continuation of the war and for others it will be because of his failure to conduct it more assertively. Similarly, far more right-wing Jews than left-wing Jews support an invasion of Lebanon to deal with Hezbollah. The result also paints a confused picture because it has to be: most Israelis, regardless of which faction they belong to, want the remaining hostages to be brought back alive and also Hamas to be dismantled. These are incompatible goals.
There are actually only two ways to do this War in Gaza To a solution; either through mediation and international agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, aimed at sidelining Hamas and normalizing Israel's place in the Middle East over time, or through a one-time confrontation between Israel, backed by the US on one side, and Iran and its many proxies on the other.
Neither Hamas's new political leader Yahya Sinwar or Netanyahu have any interest in that. Just as importantly, both are in a position to shake their much larger patrons by their tails. It's tempting to argue that Sinwar's desire to escalate the war is born of desperation, while Netanyahu's is born of the belief that the combined firepower of the US and Israel will destroy everything before him. But both assumptions concern me.
The first is a concern because the dramatically savage nature of the attack staged by Sinwar on October 7 suggests that it wanted to draw Hezbollah and Iran into the fight from the start. It reflects less desperation than strategy. Melamed thinks it is possible that with Hezbollah's signal on Sunday that it does not want to escalate with Israel, Sinwar may lose hope of escalating the war and accept the revised ceasefire agreement that is still being discussed. I hope he is right. If not, it is at least worth considering whether it would be wise to give Sinwar the regional conflict it wants.
As far as Israeli self-confidence goes, military tools have always looked more decisive than their softer options, even though it has been proven many times – in Vietnam, Lebanon, Afghanistan (twice), Iraq and now Ukraine – that this is often an illusion. Israel is in an unpleasant situation that few outside the country are willing to recognize, but a major war is less likely to bring the country the stability it needs than to introduce new sources of threat and insecurity.
(Bloomberg Opinion by Mark Champion)
Netanyahu's popularity ratings have risen again this month, surpassing opposition leader Benny Gantz as the best person to lead Israel for the first time since the conflict began, according to a survey conducted by Israel's Lazarus Agency for the daily newspaper Maariv. And when the Israel Democracy Institute asked whether people want their country to expand the war to fight Hezbollah in Lebanon, the answer was mostly yes.
As I have written before, Israel opening a second front of its own volition would precipitate an unforeseen conflict that could involve Iran, the US and perhaps other countries, none of which would benefit. Yet a large group in Israel believes this is the perfect time for a confrontation with Iran and the proxies it has built around the country. That is unlikely to change after a massive exchange of rocket fire with Hezbollah on Sunday morning, followed by statements from both sides that indicate they do not intend to escalate any further.
The argument is that while Hamas itself is not an existential threat, the enormous power it wields in Tehran is an existential threat – and there has never been a better time to eliminate this threat.
That’s because Hamas has been largely crushed as a military force, leaving Iran with one arrow in its quiver; Israeli settlements along the northern border with Lebanon have already been evacuated, a necessity for any invasion; US forces are already deployed throughout the region to help neutralize any response from Iran in Gaza or the killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in July; and the regime in Tehran has yet to develop a nuclear deterrent.
I asked Avi Melamed, a former Israeli security official whom I have found to be a reliable interpreter, to help me make sense of all this. He said, “Israel is now fighting for its survival, and the biggest threat is coming from the Iranian regime, and I'm not sure people in the West understand that.”
Much of the world may be focused on the existential threat ordinary Palestinians already face in Gaza, but viewed from Tel Aviv, Iran has spent decades building what Melamed calls a “noose around Israel’s neck,” starting with Hezbollah and expanding to include militias in Syria, Iraq, Hamas and the Houthis in Yemen.
Now it is trying to involve Jordan as well, Melamed says. And once Iran has a nuclear deterrent, Tehran's proxies under its umbrella will be able to act against Israel with even more impunity. There will be a conflict with Iran, he says: “It will happen sooner or later, it's inevitable, and right now certain elements are playing into our hands.” Indeed, for some Israelis, Iran and Hezbollah's reluctance to start a war right now means that Israel should start one, because it means the other side is clearly not ready.
I largely agree with this analysis. Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis all speak openly about their goal, which is to eliminate the State of Israel. The October 7 killings and rapes gave a preview of what this could mean for Israelis in the future.
But before concluding that this is what “Israel” wants, it is worth taking a closer look at the survey data. It shows that this is a deeply divided nation, with the 20% Arab population often responding very differently from liberal Jews, and liberal Jews again thinking very differently from religious and nationalist right-wing respondents.
So while most Israelis say they are unhappy with the government, for some it will be because of Netanyahu's continuation of the war and for others it will be because of his failure to conduct it more assertively. Similarly, far more right-wing Jews than left-wing Jews support an invasion of Lebanon to deal with Hezbollah. The result also paints a confused picture because it has to be: most Israelis, regardless of which faction they belong to, want the remaining hostages to be brought back alive and also Hamas to be dismantled. These are incompatible goals.
There are actually only two ways to do this War in Gaza To a solution; either through mediation and international agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, aimed at sidelining Hamas and normalizing Israel's place in the Middle East over time, or through a one-time confrontation between Israel, backed by the US on one side, and Iran and its many proxies on the other.
Neither Hamas's new political leader Yahya Sinwar or Netanyahu have any interest in that. Just as importantly, both are in a position to shake their much larger patrons by their tails. It's tempting to argue that Sinwar's desire to escalate the war is born of desperation, while Netanyahu's is born of the belief that the combined firepower of the US and Israel will destroy everything before him. But both assumptions concern me.
The first is a concern because the dramatically savage nature of the attack staged by Sinwar on October 7 suggests that it wanted to draw Hezbollah and Iran into the fight from the start. It reflects less desperation than strategy. Melamed thinks it is possible that with Hezbollah's signal on Sunday that it does not want to escalate with Israel, Sinwar may lose hope of escalating the war and accept the revised ceasefire agreement that is still being discussed. I hope he is right. If not, it is at least worth considering whether it would be wise to give Sinwar the regional conflict it wants.
As far as Israeli self-confidence goes, military tools have always looked more decisive than their softer options, even though it has been proven many times – in Vietnam, Lebanon, Afghanistan (twice), Iraq and now Ukraine – that this is often an illusion. Israel is in an unpleasant situation that few outside the country are willing to recognize, but a major war is less likely to bring the country the stability it needs than to introduce new sources of threat and insecurity.
(Bloomberg Opinion by Mark Champion)
